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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0196

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARMN, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEOGITATIONS: APRIL 15 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

THE FINAL PLENARY MEETING OF THE ELEVENTH ROUND OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE ON APRIL 15. US REP AND SOVIET REP (TARASOV) MADE THE ONLY STATEMENTS. US REP'S STATEMENT IS REPORTED BY SEPTEL. IN HIS PRESENTATION, TARASOV STRESSED THAT OFFICIAL DATA NOW ON THE TABLE SHOWED APPROXIMATE EQUALITY BETWEEN WARSAW PACT AND NATO MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND THAT THE WEST HAD FAILED TO PROVE ITS CLAIMS TO THE CONTRARY. SOVIET REP STRONGLY ATTACKED THE WESTERN POSITION ALONG FAMILIAR LINES, LINKING IN THE PROCESS THE RELUCTANCE OF THE WEST TO PROVIDE NATIONAL MANPOWER FIGURES FOR WESTERN
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DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US TO THE EASTERN SUSPICION THAT THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ARE SEEKING TO AVOID REDUCTIONS. TARASOV URGED ADOPTION OF THE FEBRUARY 1976 EASTERN PROPOSALS AS THE BASIS FOR AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT AND RENEWED THE EASTERN APPEAL FOR AN IMMEDIATE FREEZE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA. AN INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE ORIGINAL RUSSIAN TEXT OF SOVIET REP'S STATEMENT FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT:

1. THE 11TH ROUND OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS IS DRAWING TO A CLOSE.

2. AS IS KNOWN, THIS HAS BEEN A ROUND OF A PARTICULAR CHARACTER. IN THE FIRST PLACE, ALL THE DELEGATIONS HAVE HAD AT THEIR DISPOSAL THE OFFICIAL NUMERICAL DATA OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOCIALIST STATES AND THE NATO COUNTRIES IN THE REGION OF REDUCTIONS. IT HAS BEEN POSSIBLE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SERIOUSLY TO STUDY AND COMPARE THESE DATA AND TO WEIGH UP WHAT INFLUENCE THEY MIGHT EXERT ON THE APPROACH OF THE VARIOUS PARTICIPANTS TO THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

3. THE DATA WHICH HAS BEEN BROUGHT FORWARD BY THE SIDES PROVES AN APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES INCLUDING GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THIS UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANT FACT THAT IN CENTRAL EUROPE THERE HAS COME ABOUT, AND HAS BEEN PRESERVED DURING A LONG PERIOD, A BALANCE IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES OF THE TWO MILITARY GROUPINGS. AS IS KNOWN, THIS SITUATION HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED - AND WE HAVE MORE THAN ONCE GIVEN QUOTATIONS IN THIS REGARD - BY THE LEADING STATESMEN OF WESTERN COUNTRIES.

4. PROCEEDING FROM THIS SITUATION WHICH EXISTS IN REALITY, THE QUESTION OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES CAN ONLY BE SOLVED ON THE BASIS OF THE SINGLE JUST APPROACH -THROUGH EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS FOR ALL STATES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING. IF THE WEST WOULD ACCEPT THE JUDICIOUS PROPOSAL PUT BY THE SOCIALIST

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COUNTRIES AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THEN THE FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES WOULD BE REDUCED PROPORTIONALLY TO THEIR SIZE AND, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, BOTH GROUPINGS WOULD CARRY OUT APPROXIMATELY EQUAL REDUCTIONS. THIS WOULD BE A REALLY FAIR OUTCOME WHICH WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES TO ANYONE'S BENEFIT.

5. THE WESTERN STATES, UNFORTUNATELY, CONSTRUCTED THEIR POSITION ON ONE-SIDED, INCORRECT AND UNPROVEN ASSESSMENTS OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO WHICH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ALLEGEDLY POSSESS IN THIS AREA A SIGNIFICANT NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY. IN DOING THIS, THEY PLACED, AS THEY HAD DONE EARLIER, PARTICULAR ACCENT ON GROUND FORCES. AGAIN IN THIS ROUND, WESTERN REPS HAVE REPEATED EARLIER ASSERTIONS THAT THE EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS PRINCIPLE PROPOSED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WOULD CONTRACTUALISE THE ALLEGEDLY EXISTING "DISPARITIES" AND IN THIS WAY STRENGTHEN THE SO-CALLED "INSTABILITY" IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

6. WE HAVE ALREADY SAID MORE THAN ONCE IN THIS CONFERENCE HALL THAT THE AIM OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS IS TO BRING ABOUT THE SORT OF REDUCTION IN ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WHICH, WITHOUT ALTERING THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WHICH HAS HISTORICALLY EMERGED IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WOULD LEAD TO A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN MILITARY POTENTIALS. TO THINK THAT, AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, IT IS POSSIBLE TO CHANGE THE BALANCE OF FORCES IS UNREAL FROM THE OUTSET. THEREFORE AT THIS STAGE WHEN THE DATA WHICH HAS BEEN PRESENTED OBJECTIVELY UNDERLINES THE APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN THIS RELATIONSHIP, TO ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE ITS ALTERATION TO THE BENEFIT OF ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER IS SIMPLY TO DRAG OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

1. THE THOROUGH ATTEMPTS BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCOVER, DESPITE THE TABLED FIGURES, CERTAIN "SIGNIFICANT DISPARITIES" IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES AND THE WARSAW PACT CAN ONLY BE VIEWED AS EITHER AN ATTEMPT SO TO SPEAK TO PRESERVE THE "HONOUR OF THE UNIFORM" (SIC) AND TO JUSTIFY THE SORT OF THINKING WHICH THE MILITARY POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF NATO HAS BEEN TRYING TO ENJECT

INTO PUBLIC OPINION AND PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATIVES OF WESTERN COUNTRIES FOR MANY YEARS, OR TO GAIN FOR THEMSELVES UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AT ANY COST. NEITHER OF THESE WILL ASSIST A SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION.

8. DURING THIS ROUND THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE NOT PRESENTED AND, NATURALLY, CANNOT PRESENT, ANY PROOF THAT
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THEIR ASSESSMENTS, WHICH DO NOT CORRESPOND TO THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS, ARE CORRECT.

9. OF COURSE, WE WILL BE READY TO CONTINUE IN THE FUTURE THE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF NUMERICAL DATA. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A POSITIVE RESULT, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR THE WESTERN STATES SOBERLY TO ASSESS THE SITUATION AND TO RE-EXAMINE THEIR COUNTING RULES FOR THE FORCES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. AN OBJECTIVE CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THESE COUNTING RULES WILL UNAVOIDABLY LEAD THEM TO CORRECT THE PRESENT INCORRECT, INFLATED ASSESSMENTS AND TO CONFIRM THE NUMERICAL DATA WHICH WE HAVE TABLED. AS A RESULT OF THIS, A COMMON, MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE BASIS WILL BE FOUND FOR WORKING OUT AN AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE STATES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

10. WE ASSUME THAT THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT HAS LONG EXISTED. IT CONSISTS IN THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES WHICH ARE WELL KNOWN TO ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE DO NOT PUT FORWARD THESE PROPOSALS IN THE FORM OF A CATEGORIC DEMAND: "EITHER ACCEPT OR REJECT". WE ARE READY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE CONSTRUCTIVE CONSIDERATIONS OF OUR PARTNERS, WE ARE READY TO GO TO SENSIBLE AND BUSINESS-LIKE COMPROMISES. THIS WAS SHOWN IN PARTICULAR BY THE AGREEMENT BY THE SOCIALIST STATES TO DIVIDE THE WHOLE PROCESS OF REDUCTIONS INTO TWO PHASES, WHICH IS TO SAY TO REDUCE SOVIET FORCES WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THE BASIC BACKBONE OF NATO FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD REMAIN UNTOUCHED.

11. HOWEVER IT WOULD NOT BE CORRECT TO VIEW THE FLEXIBILITY IN OUR POSITION AS A DEPARTURE FROM THOSE BASIC AND UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES WITHOUT WHOSE OBSERVANCE A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS STANDING BEFORE US CANNOT BE ACHIEVED. THESE PRINCIPLES, WHICH FOUND REFLECTION IN THE FINAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS, INCLUDE FIRST AND FOREMOST THE FOLLOWING:

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12. FIRSTLY, THE REDUCTION OF FORCES MUST BE MUTUAL. PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THIS WE CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT, IN AN AGREEMENT FOR THE FIRST STAGE, THE DETAILED AND WORKED OUT COMMITMENTS FOR REDUCTIONS BY USSR AND USA FORCES AS WELL AS ALBEIT GENERAL COMMITMENTS BY OTHER DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES, WHICH GUARANTEE THAT THEIR FORCES WILL ALSO BE REDUCED IN A DEFINITE VOLUME AND IN DEFINITE PERIODS OF TIME, SHOULD BE INCLUDED.

13. SECONDLY, THE REDUCTION MUST BE EQUIVALENT. THEREFORE WE CONTINUE TO CONSIDER THAT THE MOST JUST METHOD OF IMPLEMENTING THE REDUCTION IS AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION BY ALL STATES OF THE LEVEL OF THEIR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT THE REDUCTION RESPECTING THIS SAME PRINCIPLE OF EQUIVALENCE, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MADE ON THE SAME BASIS - BY WHOLE MILITARY UNITS AND SUB-UNITS.

14. THIRDLY, NOT ONLY THE PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE REDUCTION BUT ALSO ARMAMENTS INCLUDING AIR FORCES AND UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CREATE THE SORT OF SITUATION WHEREBY CERTAIN COUNTRIES REDUCE CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF ARMAMENTS WHILE OTHERS RETAIN THE RIGHT TO INCREASE THEM IN AN UNLIMITED FASHION. SUCH A SITUATION IS ESPECIALLY IMPERMISSIBLE AT THE PRESENT TIME WHEN ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT PLAY AN ENORMOUS ROLE IN FORCES.

15. DURING THE ROUND WHICH IS COMING TO AN END, PARTICIPANTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED NOT ONLY IN THE EXAMINATION OF NUMERICAL DATA BUT HAVE ALSO CONTINUED THE DISCUSSION ON THE PRINCIPLED ISSUES CONCERNING THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTIONS, MANY OF WHICH, AS IS KNOWN, ARE NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH DATA. THE DISCUSSION OF THESE PRINCIPLED ISSUES HAS NOT UNFORTUNATELY LED TO A CHANGE IN THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WHICH, CLEARLY, ARE STILL UNWILLING DECISIVELY TO SET OUT ON THE PATH OF MUTUAL REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES IN CONFIDENTIAL

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CENTRAL EUROPE.

16. THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS, IN THEIR STATEMENTS, HAVE NOT BROUGHT FORWARD ANY NEW ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR POSITION AND EVERYTHING THEY HAVE SAID BOILS DOWN IN ESSENCE TO A RHETORICAL ASSERTION THAT THEY ALLEGEDLY AWAIT OUR RESPONSE TO THEIR PROPOSAL OF 16 DECEMBER 1975. INCIDENTALLY IT IS WELL KNOWN TO PARTICIPANTS IN THESE NEGOTIAIONS THAT SUCH A RESPONSE WAS GIVEN BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES A LONG TIME AGO. IT IS CONTAINED IN THEIR PROPOSALS OF 19 FEBRUARY 1976

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P R 151543Z APR 77
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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

17. ON THE OTHER HAND, WESTERN STATES UNTIL THE PRESENT TIME
HAVE DECLINED TO GIVE A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO THE IMPORTANT
INITIATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST STATES CONTAINED IN THOSE PROPOSALS.

18. THE SOVIET UNION HAS AGREED TO CARRY OUT FIRST TOGETHER
WITH THE UNITED STATES THE REDUCTION OF ITS FORCES AND HAS ASKED
THE COMPLETELY JUSTIFIED QUESTION, WHEN AND IN WHAT VOLUME THE
WEST EUROPEAN STATES AND CANADA WILL REDUCE THEIR FORCES,
WHICH CONSTITUTE THREE-FOURTHS OF THE ENTIRE COMBAT STRENGTH
OF NATO IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION. HOWEVER, UP UNTIL NOW THIS
QUESTION REMAINS UNANSWERED. THEY ONLY PROMISE US THAT THESE
COUNTRIES WILL BE READY "TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS" CONCERNING
THE SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES IN A SECOND PHASE.
BUT THIS IS NOT A SERIOUS ANSWER. IT DOES NOT PERMIT A JUDGMENT
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CONCERNING WHEN AND IN WHAT VOLUME THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA WILL ACTUALLY REDUCE THEIR FORCES. SUCH A GUESSING GAME CAN ONLY AROUSE THE SUSPICION THAT THESE COUNTRIES WANT TO AVOID ENTIRELY THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES AND TO REDUCE THE WHOLE MATTER ONLY TO THE REDUCTION OF THE LEVEL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. IS THERE NOT CONFIRMATION OF THIS IN THE FACT THAT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS, OTHER THAN THE AMERICAN, DO NOT WANT EVEN TO GIVE THE NUMERICAL DATA CONCERNING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR NATIONAL FORCES? BUT SUCH A POSITION, WE SHOULD LIKE TO REPEAT ONCE AGAIN AND WILL ALL FIRMNESS, CANNOT BE ACCEPTED BY US. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, MINDFUL OF THE SECURITY OF THEIR PEOPLES, ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO CLOSE THEIR EYES TO THE FACT THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL MASS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NATO IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS COMPOSED OF THE FORCES OF THE FRG, BRITAIN, BELGIUM AND OTHER WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

19. WE CANNOT BUT BE PUT ON GUARD BY THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT NATO EVEN NOW WANTS TO RESERVE THE POSSIBILITY EVEN TO INCREASE, IN COMPARISON WITH THEIR PRESENT LEVEL, THE FORCES OF ITS INDIVIDUAL WEST EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS. THIS PURPOSE, AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT, IS SERVED BY THE CONCEPT OF "COLLECTIVE CEILINGS", WHICH AS A PRACTICAL MATTER WOULD PERMIT THE NATO COUNTRIES WHICH ARE THE MOST POWERFUL IN THE MILITARY SENSE TO INCREASE AFTER THE SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTION THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES IN COMPENSATION FOR THEIR ALLIES. INSISTING ON A SO-CALLED "COLLECTIVE CEILING" FOR THEMSELVES, THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE STRIVING AT THE SAME TIME TO LIMIT BY MEANS OF A "NATIONAL CEILING" THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION. IN THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT ROUND WE HAVE BEEN OBLIGED

AGAIN TO INDICATE THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF SUCH AN UNEQUAL AND INEQUITABLE APPROACH.

20. UP TO NOW THE COUNTRIES OF NATO PERSIST IN THEIR RELUCTANCE TO PROCEED TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT.
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HAVING BEEN OBLIGED TO AGREE TO THE WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE OF A CERTAIN PART OF THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR RESOURCES, THE COUNTRIES OF NATO CONTINUE TO DECLARE THAT THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS IS IN PRINCIPLE NEGATIVE. THIS NOT ONLY IS CONTRARY TO THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT ALSO CREATES A SITUATION WHERE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REDUCE ITS ARMAMENTS BUT THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COULD INTENSIVELY ACCUMULATE THEM WITHOUT ANY KIND OF LIMITS.

21. THE REPS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE EMPHASISED MORE THAN ONCE THAT THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE METHOD OF REDUCTION OF FORCES IS, AS BEFORE, ALSO UNJUST. DEMANDING FROM

US THE WITHDRAWAL OF AN ENTIRE SOVIET TANK ARMY, THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS WISH THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD REDUCE ITS OWN FORCES ON A SELECTIVE BASIS-BY MEANS OF INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS AND SUB-UNITS AS MAY BE DECIDED BY THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP OF NATO.

22. THESE ARE ONLY THE MOST MAJOR INADEQUACIES OF THE WESTERN POSITION, WHICH ACTS AS A BRAKE ON FORWARD MOVEMENT IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. PROGRESS IN OUR WORK MAY BE ACHIEVED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF MUTUALITY, AND WE CONTINUE TO AWAIT FROM THE COUNTRIES OF NATO A DEMONSTRATION, FINALLY, OF READINESS TO PROCEED TO A SERIOUS, BUSINESSLIKE COMPROMISE, WHICH WOULD NOT GIVE ONE-SIDED ADVANTAGES TO ANYONE.

23. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CANNOT PASS OVER THE FACT THAT WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED IN VIENNA, THE COUNTRIES OF NATO ARE INCREASING THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, CARRYING OUT A BROAD PROGRAMME FOR THEIR MODERNISATION. THIS IS A SERIOUS MILITARY-POLITICAL FACTOR, WHICH, OF COURSE, ONLY COMPLICATES THE SOLUTION OF OUR TASKS AND MAY PUT OFF THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

24. THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOT INCREASED FOR A SNUMBER OF YEARS THE COMBAT NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND ONCE AGAIN AFFIRM THEIR READINESS NOT TO DO THIS, IF THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF THE NATO COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA ALSO WILL NOT GROWN. A PERSUASIVE DEMONSTRATION OF SUCH A CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION ON THE PART OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS THEIR PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE NO-INCREASE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE STATES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS PROPOSAL DOES NOT HARM THE POSITION OF ANYONE IN QUESTIONS OF REDUCTION. IT HAS A TEMPORARY CHARACTER, SINCE IT ENVISAGES A VOLUNTARY OBLIGATION BY STATES NOT TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES DURING THE PERIOD WHEN THEY ARE CARRYING ON A DIALOGUE ON THE QUESTIN
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OF HOW TO REDUCE THESE FORCES. BY ACCEPTING OUR PROPOSAL, ALL COUNTRIES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WOULD DEMONSTRATE BEFORE THE WHOLE WORLD THEIR GOODWILL AND WOULD SHOW THAT THEY DO NOT INTEND TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF THEIR FORCES ABOVE THAT NUMERICAL STRENGTH WHICH WAS OFFICIALLY STATED BY THEM.

25. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT ROUND HAVE EXPLAINED IN DETAIL ALL THE ADVANTAGES OF THIS PROPOSAL OF THEIRS AND THOSE NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR ITS SUCCESSFUL REALISATION WHICH AROSE FOLLOWING THE PRESENTATION BY THE SIDES OF NUMERICAL DATA CONCERNING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION. THE COUNTRIES OF NATO WOULD BEHAVE MORE SENSIBLY IF, INSTEAD OF FREEZING THEIR UNREALISTIC POSITIONS ON QUESTIONS OF REDUCTION, THEY WOULD PROCEED, AS A FIRST STEP, MERELY TO A FREEZE ON THE PRESENT LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES. IN THIS WAY A REAL STEP WOULD BE TAKEN TOWARD ACHIEVING MILITARY RELAXATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. AS WAS SAID BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CC OF THE CPSU, L I BREZHNEV, "NO ONE WILL LOSE FROM THIS, AND THE CAUSE OF PEACE, THE CAUSE OF SECURITY OF THE PEOPLES WILL ONLY GAIN".

26. AS BEFORE, SO IN THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT ROUND, MANY LEADERS OF LEADING WEST EUROPEAN STATES DECLARED THEIR DESIRE FOR SUCCESS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THESE STATEMENTS DESERVE ATTENTION. HOWEVER, ONE WOULD WISH THAT THEY WOULD FIND PRACTICAL EXPRESSION IN THE WESTERN POSITION, WHICH, UNFORTUNATELY, REMAINS UNCHANGED SINCE 1973 IN ALL ITS BASIC ELEMENTS. WORDS ONLY EXERT A REAL INFLUENCE ON EVENTS WHEN THEY ARE REINFORCED BY ACTIONS. WE CAN RIGHTFULLY SAY THAT THE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF LEADING FIGURES AND GOVERNMENTS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES FIND PRECISE PRACTICAL EMBODIMENT IN THE CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION WHICH THESE COUNTRIES OCCUPY IN THE

NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE ACTIVELY STRIVING FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE
MILITARY POTENTIAL OF THE TWO GROUPINGS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE
STRENGTHENING OF STABILITY AND RELAXATION ON THE EUROPEAN
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CONTINENT, INCLUDING IN THE MILITARY FIELD. THE PROPOSALS OF THE
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES FOR AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION OF ALL
FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS ALSO FULLY CORRESPOND TO THIS NOBLE ASPIRATION.
IN THIS CONNECTION WE ONCE AGAIN CALL UPON THE WESTERN
DELEGATIONS IN THE COURSE OF THE FORTHCOMING RECESS ONCE
AGAIN TO RE-EXAMINE THEIR POSITION AND TO MAKE IN IT CORRECTIONS
BASED UPON REALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVENESS. IT IS NECESSARY
THROUGH COMMON EFFORTS TO SECURE PROGRESS IN THE SOLUTION OF
THIS PROBLEM, VITALLY IMPORTANT FOR ALL EUROPEAN PEOPLES AS
FOR OTHERS, THE DISCUSSION OF WHICH IS FOLLOWED WITH GREAT
ATTENTION BY WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. END TEXT. RESOR

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
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Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
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Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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Format: TEL
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Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2795329
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEOGITATIONS: APRIL 15 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT THE FINAL PLENARY MEETING OF THE ELEVENTH ROUND OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE ON APRIL 15. US REP A
TAGS: PARM, US, UR, XT, XH, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/0beb98a4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
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Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009